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SOME ASPECTS OF

THE NEW YORK CITY RETAIL SALES TAX.-

On December 5, 1934, pursuant to power and authority delegated by
the State Legislature,' the Municipal Assembly of New York City
imposed a tax of two 2(2) per cent upon the amount of receipts from
retail sales in the city.
Although the sales tax in form is of ancient origin,3 it has only
lately become prominent in the fiscal systems of governments. At
the close of the World War, when financial difficulties were acute,
its use became quite general in modern Europe, then Australia, next
Central America and finally in Canada and various parts
South and
4
of Asia.
In this country, the states were slow to adopt such a tax, but
after its appearance in West Virginia in 1929, it quickly spread in
various guises throughout the Union. 5
From the fact that the various sales tax statutes were passed so
recently, it may be inferred that they were merely temporary measures. This is true, for in few of the states is the taxing period extended beyond 1935.6 That this tax shows no signs of permanency
appears from the fact that although manifestly undesirable, it is supported by many (who oppose it in principle) only because they feel
1

N. Y. LAws 1934, c. 873. "An act to enable, temporarily, any city of
the state Eaving a population of one million inhabitants or more to adopt and
amend local laws, imposing in any such city any tax and/or taxes which the
Legislature has or would have power and authority to impose, to relieve the
people of any such city from the hardships and sufferings caused by unemployment and to limit the application of such local laws."
IN. Y. CITY LOCAL LAW No. 20 (1934), effective Dec. 5, taxing date
begins Dec. 10, 1934 and terminates Dec. 31, 1935.
'Haig and Shoup trace it, in some form or other, to ancient Greece and
Rome, and, but intermittently, in various European countries up to the year
1800.
'Germany, in 1918, was the first to adopt the sales tax to bolster its
failing financial structure, France made use of it in 1920, and by the year
1923, all of the belligerents in the late war but England had availed themselves
of its possibilities. Haig and Shoup (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 809; Sales and
Turnover Taxes, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD (1929).
5Haig and Shoup, The Sales Tax in the American States (1934) 34 CoL
L. REv. 809; Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Mexco, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin.
a See PRENncE HALL SALES TAx REPORTS; Tax Statutes of the several
states in CMmERcIAL CLEARING HOUSE REPORTS.
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is preferable to further curtailment of
that any source of revenue
7
government activity.

The sales tax is of such recent importance, that present day
scholars and laymen alike have been generally uninformed as to the
economic principles and potentialities of such a tax. Although the
in harmonious
opinions of political and tax economists are not at all
agreement as to its revenue producing capabilities,8 there is something akin to complete unanimity in roundly condemning its effects,
if the tax is to be more than temporary. Professor Seligman characterizes it as a tax of "the last resort," 9 and objects to it strenuously
as a "tax on consumption and expenditure." 10 Such a tax is anathema, to the poor, for it reduces their consumption purchases 11
even as to necessities. 12 Similarly, it is disliked by the wage and
salary earners of the middle class, who are faced with the alternatives
of reducing their savings or their purchases. Nor is it welcomed by
business people, who realize not only that such a tax drives business
into neighboring cities or states free from the burden of tax on
is almost a necessales, 13 but also that
14 the payment of higher wages
sary concomitant.
Nor do European economists or financial experts welcome the
sales tax there, for Sokolnikoff, writing in England, and Bokenowski, 15 speaking in France, follow Adam Smith in denouncing it
as economically unsound if it is to be permanent; although the latter
(Bokenowski) hastens to apologize for it as an "imp6t d urgence, un
imp6t de salut public."
In opposition to charges that the sales tax will lead to petty
evasions and that it is unjust, burdensome and unsound, its exponents maintain that it is only a temporary expedient, simple to administer and16 a boon to the already overburdened tax sources of the
community.
I Sales and Turnover Taxation, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD
(1929).
1 O'Connor, The Availability of a Sales Tax in Tennessee, 12 TENN.
L. REv. 249; GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN TAXATION, at 128.
'Senate Hearing on Revenue Act, 1921, at 462.
Professor Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Sales Tax, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC
FINANCE, at 136.

'Alfred G. Buehler, Recent Developments of the General Sales Tax, 36

JOUR. OF POLITICAL ECONOM'Y 92.

' For, gas and electric service, certainly necessities today, are taxable under
our sales tax.
'

Walter S. Hallanam, West Virginia Sales Tax, A Year's Administration

Experience, NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS, 15th Nat. Conf., 1922,

at 108.
142 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 535.
M. Sokolnikoff (July 2, 1928) MANCHESTER GUARDIAN SUPP. at 225.
M. Bokanowski, speaking before the French Chamber of Deputies finance
committee, cited in Sales and Turnover Taxation, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD (1929).
"Authorities cited in Sales and Turnover Taxation, NAT. IND. CON'.
BOARD (1929).
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The purpose of the Sales Tax as set forth in the Enabling Act 17
and the local law is to meet the pressing financial problems besetting
local unemployment relief.
That the state has the power to delegate such authority to tax
is clearly recognized by the Constitution.' 8
Does it conform to the other Constitutional requirements? Under
the State Constitution it is required that tax laws shall distinctly
state the tax and the object to which it is to be applied, and it is
further stated that it shall be insufficient to refer to any other law
to fix such tax or object. 19 It may be contended that the Enabling
Act does not conform to this provision in that it fails to state the
amount of the tax and, further, that it is necessary to refer to other
laws (the local law) in order to ascertain the amount. This contention cannot be upheld for (1) this provision of the Constitution has
no application to an act authorizing assessments for local purposes,2 0
and (2) similar provisions in other state constitutions have been
liberally construed so as to uphold the law, if practicable. 2' The
objection may not be heard that such a tax is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that some taxpayers derive no benefit from
unemployment relief. The rule is that the validity of the taxing
power does not depend upon the taxpayers' enjoyment of any special
benefit from use of funds
raised by taxation as long as a general
22
public purpose is served.
A municipality of itself has no inherent power of taxation.23
Inherent right to tax exists only as an attribute of a sovereignty like
the state or federal government, and the only right of a municipality
to tax is by virtue of a delegation from the sovereignty.2 4 This may
"Supra note 2 as amended by Municipal assembly Dec. 21, 1934.
"N. Y. CoNsT. art. XII, §§1 and 3. Townsend v. New York, 16 Hun
362 (1878), aff'd, 77 N. Y. 542 (1879) ; lit re Zoborowski, 68 N. Y. 88 (1877).
IN. Y. CoNsT. art. III, §24.

-Guest v. Brooklyn, 8 Hun 97 (N. Y. 1876).
'Unity v. Burrage, 103 U. S.447, 459, 26 L. ed. 405, 409 (1880) ; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 27 L. ed. 431 (1882); Ackley School Dist.
v. Hall, 113 U. S.135, 28 L. ed. 954 (1885); Carter County v. Stinton, 120
U. S.517, 30 L. ed. 70 (1887); People ex rel. City of Rochester v. Briggs,
50 N. Y. 553 (1872) ; In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306, 10 N. E. 685 (1877) ;
Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 347 ( ); Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn.
578, 50 N. W. 923 (1891).
'Nashville, Chattanooga and St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup.
Ct. 345 (1933).
'In Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 246 Ill. 20, 92 N. E. 597 (1910),
aff'd, 228 U. S. 61, 33 Sup. Ct. 441 (1913), Vickers, C. J.: "They (municipalities) do not possess, independently of grant, any inherent power, the statute
under which they act is a grant of power and not a limitation, as is the
constitution of the state. In the case of a municipality tax, its validity depends

upon whether the power to levy it has been expressly granted, while in respect
to a tax levied by the state the only question is "Does the constitution

prohibit it?"
"City of Rochester v. Bloss, 185 N. Y. 42, 77 N. E. 794 (1906) ; In re

Second Ave. M. E. Church, 66 N. Y. 395 (1876) ; Sharpe v. Johnson, 4 Hill 92
(N. Y. 1843)

Sharpe v. Speir, 4 Hill 76 (N. Y. 1843) ; Commrs. Brownsville
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be in the form of a grant directly by constitutional provision, by
charter or by statute. In the case of the tax law now under consideration, the
delegation resulted by virtue of a statutory
25
authorization.
A further limitation or restriction upon the power of the municipality concerns the right to grant exemptions. A local government
has no inherent powers to grant exemptions from local taxes, 26 for,

inherent power to exempt presupposes inherent power to tax and
this power, as we have seen, does not exist in a municipality. An
exemption by the local municipality will be upheld as valid only
where the State Legislature expressly grants the right to make exemptions in its tax laws 27 or where the power to grant exemptions
may be necessarily implied from the grant of power to tax.2 8 In
the Athens case the court held that where the grant by the state to
the municipality authorized "full power and authority" to tax, by
implication of the courts, the power to make exemptions will be included in the grant. This precise question arises as to our sales tax.
Are the exemptions which the city has made in the cases mentioned
below, and several other exemptions included in the act, valid? We
are fully cognizant of the fact that exemptions are not favored and
will be sustained, only where specifically granted by the legislature,
in clear and unambiguous language,2 sa but it seems fairly reasonable
that a valid grant of power to exempt from taxes may be implied
from the language employed in the State Enabling Act, to wit: "To
impose any tax or taxes which the Legislature has or would have
power and authority to impose." Of course, whether the New York
courts would follow the decision of the Athens case is impossible to
predict with certainty, yet, it seems very likely that it would be followed if the precise question arose.
The New York City Sales Tax itself 29 imposes a tax of two
Taxing District v. Loague, 129 U. S. 493, 9 Sup. Ct. 327 (1888); United
States v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582 (1878); City of Cleveland v. United
States, 111 Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901); Lane v. Mayor of City of
Unadvilla, 154 Ga. 577, 114 S. E. 636 (1922).
- N. Y. LAWS 1934, c. 873.
'J. W. Perry Co. v. Norfolk, 220 U. S. 472, 31 Sup. Ct. 465 (1911);
City of St. Louis v. United R. Cos., 210 U. S. 266, 28 Sup. Ct. 630 (1908).
City of Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924) ; McTwiggan v. Hunter, 19 R. .1. 265, 33 A. 5 (1895); Henderson v. Hughes County,
13 S. D. 576, 83 N. W. 682 (1900).
"Athens v. Long, 54 Ga. 330.
'a People ex rel. Andrews v. Cameron, 140 App. Div. 76, 124 N. Y. Supp.
949 (1910), aff'd, 200 N. Y. 585, 94 N. E. 1097 (1911) ; It re Francis' Estate,
121 App. Div. 129, 105 N. Y. Supp. 643 (1907), aff'd on opinion below, 189
N. Y. 554, 82 N. E. 1126 (1907); People v. Purdy, 179 App. Div. 805, 167
N. Y. Supp. 285 (1917), affd, 224 N. Y. 710, 121 N. E. 885 (1918).
IN.

Y. CITY

LOCAL LAW

No. 20 as amended by N. Y.

No. 24 (effective Dec. 28, 1934).

CITY LOCAL LAW
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per cent 30 on sales 31 made within the city of New York. Sales
of food products, of periodicals, of water delivered through mains,
sales by or to semi-public institutions and sales by or to the city and
state, are expressly tax exempt. 32 Are these exemptions a denial
of the equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment? Do they offend against the principle of equality upon which
every just and reasonable system of taxation is based? 33 That the
city has no power to discriminate is well settled,34 but "perfect equality in assessment of taxation is unobtainable." 35 Classification, in
itself, is not inherently bad. It is only where it is unduly discriminatory or unreasonable that it is, objectionable. 36 No iron-bound
rule of equality need be adopted and the exemptions found in the
Sales Tax Law are not unreasonable classifications such as would
constitute unequal protection of the law. 3 7 The state may exempt
certain classes of property from any tax whatsoever, and among
these are the semi-public institutions enumerated in the law.39 The
power of the legislature to exempt as well as to tax cannot be dis40
puted where the power is not specifically curbed by the Constitution.
I N. Y. CITY LOCAL LAW No. 20 §2. But the comptroller was empowered
to create a schedule to practically apply the two per cent provision. See RULES
AND REGULATIONS art. 3, issued Feb. 11, 1935, for schedule. In operation, the
schedule imposes a tax of from 8% on small-priced items, but never less than
2%. For example, the tax on a thirteen-cent article is one cent.
Sales, as defined in §1, subd. (e) of the Local Law, mean any transfer
of title or possession (for consumption and not for resale) of personalty and
the rendition of services popularly denominated of a public utility nature.
Under this definition many transactions would be classified as sales and
taxable as such which are not sales within the meaning of the Uniform Sales
Act. For the sale to be a true sale under the Sales Act, the agreement must
contemplate a present transfer of title, a transfer in praesenti rather than a
transfer of title in futuro. WHITNEY, LAW OF SALES 2 ed. (1934). Edwards v.
Farmers' Fire Ins. Co., etc., Co., 21 Wend. 467 (N. Y. 1839) ; Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. Standard Asphalt Co., 39 App. Div. 617, 58 N. Y. Supp. 405
(1899). Therefore under the Local Law, contracts or agreements to sell and
contracts for hire or leasing of personal property are classed as sales and are
taxable. RULES AND REGS. art. 9 (1935).
* Supra note 29, §2, subd. (d).
'People v. Barker, 150 N. Y. 52, 44 N. E. 785 (1896).
'Hoffman Candy Co. v. City of Newport Beach, 120 Cal. App. 525,
8 Pac. (2d) 235 (1932); Chalker & Birmingham R. R. et al., 249 U. S. 522,
39 Sup. Ct. 366 (1919); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brichell, 233 U. S. 304,
34 Sup. Ct. 493 (1914).
mCooLEY, LAW OF TAXATION 177, quoting Commonwealth v. Savings
Bank, 3 Allen (Mass.) 436.
People v. Raynes, 136 App. Div. 417, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1053, aff'd, 198
N. Y. 539, 92 N. E. 1097 (1910).
'Lutz v. Arnold, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, Jan. 29, 1935.
Supra note 37; Bell's Gap Rd. v. Penn, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup.
Ct 533 (1890).
mRULES AND REGs. art. 12 (1935).
"' COOLEY, LAW OF TAXATION 4; BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed.)
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All properties, callings, etc., need not be classified together.41 It is
enough that there be no discrimination within any class and that
the taxing authority treat all within the same class alike.42 That
the sales of food stuffs and water delivered through mains are free
from tax, does not constitute unlawful discrimination within the
purview of the Constitution, for so long as the exemption is based
upon sound public policy, and is aimed at the preservation of
43 public
health and welfare, the courts will uphold it as reasonable.
The Act provides further that the tax be paid by the purchaser
to the vendor who shall be deemed the agent and trustee for the
city.44 As defined by Section 1, subdivision (a), the word "person,"
referring to purchasers and vendors, includes practically every legal
entity45 including receivers. In the Matter of Flatbush Gum Co.,
Inc.,

the court raises the rather baffling question as to the legality

of a tax on sales made by receivers in bankruptcy, as a tax on an
instrumentality of the national government. The question was not
before that court, however, since the State Sales Tax,46 there litigated, did not include federal receivers in the enumeration of "persons" taxable. The New York City Sales Tax does specifically include receivers 47 and therefore the question is squarely put.
Recognizing the principle that the unrestrained power to tax involves, in law, the power to destroy, 48 the courts have consistently
all privileges lawfully granted by
protected from state
49 interference
the United States.
A federal statute 50 has only lately resolved the question (which
'State Board of Tax Com'rs etc. v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct.
540 (1831); cf. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481 (1933);
see also Bells Gap R. R. v. Penn, mupra note 38; Grozzi v. Tiernan, 148 U. S.
657, 13 Sup. Ct. 721 (1883); Pacific Express Co. v. Siebert, 142 U. S. 339,
12 Sup. Ct. 250 (1892).
'Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631 (1932);
American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43
(1900).
A. Shulte, Inc., Minton v. Groves, 274 N. Y. Supp. 641 [App. Div.
43D.
(3d Dept. 1934)] ; People ex rel. Farrington v. Mensching, 187 N. Y. 8, 79 N. E.
884 (1907); Park and Tilford v. Graves, 273 N. Y. Supp. 431 [App. Div.
(3d Dept. 1934)].
"N. Y. CITy LOCAL LAW No. 24 §3; also RULES AND REGS. art 16 (1935).
S. Circuit Ct. of Appeals, 2d Dist., Nov. 5, 1934, 73 F. (2d) 283
'5U.
(C. C. A. -N. Y. 2d, 1934).

'IN.

Y. TAx LAw §391.
" LOCAL LAW No. 24 §1 subd. (a).

48M'Culloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 416 (U. S. 1819); Osborn v. Bank
of U. S., 9 Wheat. 733 (U. S.1824) ;Weston v. City Council, etc., 2 Pet. 449
(U. S.1829); People of New York v. Com'r of Taxes, 2 Black 620 (U. S.
1862); Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200 (U. S. 1864); Van Allen v. Assessor,
3 Wall. 573 (U. S. 1865).
41Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824); Passenger Cases, 7 How.
283 (U. S. 1848); Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S.
22 How. 227 (U. S. 1859).
1854): Sinnot v. Davenport,
H. B. 8544, Public Act 392, effective June 18, 1934.

CURRENT LEGISLATION
had until then been in doubt)51 of the taxability of sales by receivers
engaged in conducting the business of a bankrupt, by permitting the
state to tax them to the same extent as if such business were conducted by an individual or corporation.
But the New York City statute does not distinguish between
sales by a receiver authorized to conduct and continue the business
of a bankrupt, and sales made by a receiver in liquidating the assets
of a business. Instead, the comptroller, in interpreting the Act,
flatly asserts that sales by the latter are taxable, even when the receiver is appointed by a federal court. 52 Is such an interpretation
valid?
That it is not within the power of a state to lay a tax upon
an instrumentality or agency of the United States Government, when
that agency is engaged in executing a federal function, 53 has been
clearly recognized. 5 4 Marshall, C. J., said in M'Culloch v. Maryland,55 that "the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of
the Constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution
the powers vested in the general government." Is this so only where
the tax directly constitutes a burden on governmental functions of
the United States? 56 Taxes by a city or state, which place no excessive burden on an instrumentality of the government, but, instead, allow it to function, unhindered and unimpaired, and as expeditiously as it was intended by the Federal Government, have been
57
held not to fall within the prohibition of M'Culloch v. Maryland.
Niel H. Jacoby, Conflicting Interpretations of Retail Sales
'Illinois:
Tax, 2 U. OF CHIC. L. REv. 78, 93.
California: Cal. Letter of Frank M. Keeling, Ass't Director, Sales Tax
Division, State Board of Equalization, Oct. 24, 1933.
Oklahoma: OKLA. RuLES AND REGs.; Okla. Tax Comm., Dec. 22, 1933,
§5 (1933).
These states contend that sales made pursuant to their respective statutes
are within the purview of the law, and are supported by Howe v. Atlantic,
Pacific and Gulf Oil Co., Dist. Ct. for Northern of Ill. Eastern Div., No.
11268, May 4, 1934. A contrary view, taken in Howe v. Atlantic, Pacific and
Gulf Oil Co. (State of Mo. Intervenors) 4 F. Supp. 162 (D. C. 8th, 1933)
was reversed.
'RuLES

AND

REms. art. 64 (1935).

U. S. CONsT. Art. 1, subd. 4.
'Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601,
75 L. ed. 1277 (1931) ; Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75
L. ed. 304 (1931); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup.
Ct. 45 (1928) ; City of New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547, 48 Sup.
Ct. 371, 72 L. ed. 693 (1928); Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514,
46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed. 384 (1926); 61 C. J. 371, §370, subd. 2, and cases
cited therein; People ex rel. Donner Hanna Coke Corp. v. Burke, 222 App.
Div. 790, 226 N. Y. Supp. 882, aff'd, 284 N. Y. 507, 162 N. E. 503 (1928) ; 61
C. J. 372, §370, subd. 2, and cases cited therein.
4 Wheat. 415, 436 (U. S. 1819).
Grayburg Oil Co. v. State (Tex. Av. App.) 286 S. W. 489, aff'd (Comm.
App. 3 S. W. 2d, 427).
6 Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170, 75
L. ed. 400 (1931), aff'g, 41 F. (2d) 395 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1930); St. Louis

456

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

The courts may, in dealing with the present problem, consider that
a privilege, vested solely in Congress by the Federal Constitution,
will be directly impinged by the assumed authority to tax, and its
concomitant, the power to ultimately destroy. That the complete
immunity from taxation may be protected in such a case, irrespecfive of the amount of the tax, or the extent to which it curtails a
federal power, is not too remote to expect.5 8 "Just what instrumentalities of either a state or the Federal Government are exempt
from taxation by the other must receive a practical construction,
which permits both to function with a minimum of interference,
each with the other; and the limitation cannot be so varied or extended as to seriously impair either the taxing power of the government imposing the tax, or the appropriate exercise of the function
of the government affected by it." 59 The dissent in the Panhandle
case indicates that such may be the law. 59a
The local law states generally that the purchase of tangible
property not for resale is taxable, 60 and the comptroller and city
counsel have interpreted this to include purchases, by a manufacturer, of commodities which do not appear, in tangible form, in the
article manufactured. 6 1 As to such purchases the manufacture is
treated like any other ultimate consumer. For instance, if a soap
maker were to purchase tools and perfumes, the perfume, appearing
in tangible form in the finished product, is "resold" and the sale
of the perfume is not subjected to tax, while tools used and destroyed
in making the soap, but which do not appear in tangible form in
the property created, are subject to tax.
A Michigan court 63 interpreting a provision of the Michigan
Sales Tax Law,6 4 similar to ours, held that machinery, tools, etc.,
used in production, go to make up the cost, and are covered by the
ultimate selling price. "To tax the sale, to the manufacturer, who
produces the ultimate product, of instrumentalities used or consumed
in the making of that product is to tax twice." 65 Since the power
San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Midlekamp, 256 U. S. 226, 41 Sup. Ct. 488, 65 L. ed.
905 (1921); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 21 L. ed. 787 (U. S.
1873) ; Louisville First National Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353, 19 L. ed. 701
(U. S. 1869); People v. Cantor, 187 N. Y. Supp. 467, 114 Misc. 419 (1921);
61 C. J. 372, §50 and cases cited.
' Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, supra note 54; Mid-Northern
Oil Co. v. Walker, 65 Mont. 414, 211 Pac. 353 (1922); 61 C. J. 373, §370,

subd. 2.

'Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup, Ct. 172 (1926).
'a Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, supra note 54, four judges dissenting.
'ON. Y. LOCAL LAw No. 24, §1, subd. (g).
I RULES AND REGS. art. 32 (1935).

61Ibid.
' Boyer-Campbell Co. et al. v. Fry (C. D. Wayne County), Mich., April

11, 1934.

PUBLIC ACT No.
' Supra note 63.

167, Acts of 1933.
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to tax is the power to destroy,6 6 it is proper to assume that the legislature does not intend to tax oppressively or unjustly unless there is
no construction of the law which is consistent with justice and inconsistent with the desire to destroy.07 The law should not be given
an interpretation that imposes double taxation 6s or operates more
heavily on some commodities than on others, unless the statute expressly requires it or unless such construction is necessarily implied. 69
Consequently, the court held that sales of tools, machinery, etc., to
a manufacturer are not subject to tax, 70 an interpretation squarely

at odds with that given by the comptroller. Should this question
arise in New York, it is quite likely that our courts would follow
the rule of the Michigan case.
The local law requires a tax on sales made within the city of
New York. 71 However, there are limitations imposed upon this allembracing provision.
That a state has authority to tax tangible personal property
located within its jurisdiction is unquestioned. 72 It matters not that
the person taxed is neither a citizen nor a resident of the state, so
long as the property be situated within the state. 73 There is, however, a Constitutional restriction upon the power of the states to
tax. The "commerce clause" of the Federal Constitution, gives
Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states * * *." 74

The restriction on taxation of

interstate commerce results from judicial interpretation of this clause.
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 416 (U. S. 1819), and cases cited in

note 48, supra.

CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) 483, 487; Tennessee v. Whitworth,
117 U. S. 129, 6 Sup. Ct. 649 (1886) ; N. Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Stevenson, 277
Ill. 474, 115 N. E. 633 (1917); Milwaukee Ry. & Light Co. v. Wis. Tax
Comm., 207 Wis. 523, 242 N. W. 312 (1912) ; Kingsley v. City of Merill, 122
Wis. 185, 99 N. W. 1044 (1904); it re Estate of Win. Barbour, 185 App.
Div. 445, 173 N. Y. Supp. 276 (1918), aff'd, 226 N. Y. 639, 123 N. E. 854
(1919).
"By duplicate taxation in this sense is understood the requirement that
one person or any one subject of taxation shall directly contribute twice to the
same burden, while other subjects of taxation belonging to the same class are
required to contribute but once." COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) 225
and 226.
'Merchants Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 452,
157 S. W. 717 (1913); Woodruff v. Oswego Starch Factory, 177 N. Y. 23,
69 N. E. 122 (1903); In re Estate of Wn. Barbour, stupra note 67; N. Y. &
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R. R., 32 App. Div. 113, 52 N. Y. Supp. 859,
aff'd, 157 N. Y. 677, 51 N. E. 1093 (1898).
"' Supra note 63.
IN. Y. LOCAL LAw No. 24, §2.
" M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 415, 429 (U. S. 1819); Leloup v.
Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 649 (1887).
Savings etc. Soc. v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 42i, 18 Sup. Ct. 392
(1898).
' U. S. Co~sr. Art. I, §8, subd. 3.
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The decisions uniformly hold
that no state may tax or otherwise bur75
den interstate commerce.
But this does not prevent the imposition of a tax on goods contracted for in one state merely because delivery is incidentally made
from goods in another state. 76 Again, where goods used in interstate commerce have reached their ultimate destination in this state
and become incorporated in the goods of that state, when sold here,
the sale is taxable; 77 but where the goods have not reached their
final destination and are still in their original package, they are regarded as still being in interstate commerce and hence not taxable. 78
It must also be borne in mind that a state may tax property located
within the state, even though interstate movement is ultimately intended, provided that such movement has not yet commenced. 79
Where a telegraph company is engaged in the business of sending
messages, part of which is interstate and part intrastate, the imposition of a tax on those messages sent and received wholly within the
state, is not violative of the "commerce clause." 80
As we shall now see, these principles have been adhered to by
the comptroller. Under the rules promulgated, where the sale has
been made outside the city, even though delivery is made in New
York, no tax may be collected. But where the sale is made in the
'Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 648, 8 Sup. Ct. 1383 (1888); Case of
State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1872) ; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 960 So. 1 (1877) ; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (1880);
Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446 (1885); Picard v. Pullman Southern
Car Co., 117 U. S. 34 (1886); Wabash Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S.
557 (1886); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Co., 120 U. S. 489 (1887);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 7 Sup. Ct. 1126 (1887).

Wiloil Corp. v. Comm. of Pa., Sup. Ct. of U. S., Feb. 4, 1935. In the

Wiloil case, X and Y, in Pennsylvania, contracted for sale of coal to X,
delivery to be in Pennsylvania. No mention of any particular coal was made,
a delivery of any coal of the specified quality wheresoever found would have
satisfied the contract. Y shipped the coal from Delaware and the sale was
held taxable in Pennsylvania.
'Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 127 (U. S. 1868); Brown v. Houston,
114 U. S. 622, 632, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091 (1884) ; American Steel and Wire Co. v.
Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 519, 24 Sup. Ct. 365 (1904) ; Sonnebon v. Cureton, 262
U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643 (1923) ; Hart Refineries v. Hermon, 278 U. S. 499,
49 Sup. Ct. 188 (1929); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, et al., 285 U. S. 472,
52 Sup. Ct. 631 (1932); State of Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 54 Sup.
Ct. 34 (1933).
' Boyer, Campbell Co., et al. v. Fry, Circuit Ct. of Wayne County, Mich.,
April 11, 1934; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678 (U. S. 1828) ;
Leisy v. Harden, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681 (1890); Lyng v. Michigan,
135 U. S. 161, 10 Sup. Ct. 725 (1890).
Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475 (1886); Diamond Watch
Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 23 Sup. Ct. 266 (1903). Example: A sells
goods to a foreign corporation doing business in New York and delivers them
to the New York City warehouse of the corporation; the tax must be paid
even though the corporation intends later to remove the goods to another state.
"Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1881); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 128 U. S. 39, 9 Sup. Ct. 6 (1888); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472, 10 Sup. Ct. 161 (1889).
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city, and delivery is made to the purchaser himself in the city, the
tax is collectable through the purchaser intended to take the property outside the city.81 This is based on the reason that both the
sale and delivery are made within the city. On the same theory
where the sale is in the city and delivery is made partly within and
paid only on that portion which
partly outside the city, the tax is to8 be
2
has been delivered within the city.

One more important situation must be noticed. The tax is payable on property sold to a steamship company tied at piers in New
York City though the property is to be consumed by the steamship
in conducting interstate commerce. Similarly in the case of gasoline
which is to be conor oil (sold to a railroad or aeroplane company)
83
sumed in carrying on interstate commerce.
The authority to collect the tax has been vested in the comptroller. To expedite this duty various other powers covering a
wide range of functions have been delegated to him.84 In conformity
with these powers, the comptroller has provided that delinquent taxpayers may be compelled to pay their tax debts in two ways, (1) the
ordinary procedure by which the corporation counsel institutes an
action in the name of the city to recover the amount due, s 5 and
(2) by summary procedure, whereby warrants are issued, under the
comptroller's seal, to the sheriff or marshal who is commanded to
sell the property of the tax debtor.86 These warrants when served
may be sold
partake of the nature of a judgment, and the property
87
in payment of the tax without a jidicial proceeding.
While the legislature may provide for the collection of taxes
by judicial proceedings, it has uniformly been held that due process
of law in taxation does not require judicial procedure.88 What is
due process of law depends upon the class of cases to which it refers,
RULES AND

.Ibid.

REGs. art. 94 (1935).

SEastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 289 U. S.
249, 53 Sup. Ct. 591 (1933); Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. Co.
v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345 (1933); Chassanoil v. City, 291
U. S. 584, 54 Sup. Ct. 541 (1934); A. G. Spalding v. Collector, 262 U. S.
66, 43 Sup. Ct. 485 (1923). In the Eastern Air Transport, Inc. case, the
court held that the purchase of supplies or equipment for use in conducting
interstate commerce was a mere incident to and not the actual carrying on of
interstate commerce.
IN. Y. LOCAL LAW No. 24, §2, subd. 11, including the authority to adopt
rules and regulations to make valid extension of payment dates to "assess,
revise, readjust and impose the taxes authorized to be imposed * * *," to request
information and to prescribe methods for determining receipts from sales.
'RULES AND RE s. art. 25 (1935).
' Scottish Union Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611, 25 Sup. Ct. 345 (1905);
McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37 (1877).
s Supra note 85.
Dukich v. Blair, 3 F. (2d) 303 (E. D. Wash. 1925), appeal dismissed, 270
U. S. 670, 46 Sup. Ct. 469 (1925) ; Turpen v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 23 Sup.
Ct. 469 (1902); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78 (1881); McMillen v.
Anderson, 95 U. S. 37 (1877).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
upon the settled maxims of law for the protection of the individual,8 9
and upon the history and the constitution of the government wherein
it is applied. 0 It is within the power of the legislature to give to
the tax authority special remedies to compel the payment of taxes,
in addition to the ordinary methods of bringing suit.9 ' Governments must have their revenues promptly and at the appointed time,
in order to discharge their functions. They cannot await the slow
process of judicial trials in their ordinary course,9 2 but as an attribute of the sovereign power of taxation (subject only to constitutional limitations), the legislature has exclusive and discretionary
93
power to prescribe the means by which taxes may be collected.
The one limitation upon this authority is that the procedure be
not "utterly unreasonable, arbitrary, unequal or unjust in its operation." 94 That the method prescribed by the comptroller is due
process, the courts of our state have consistently determined. This
remedy (of summary procedure or distraint) existed at common
law and has been on our statute books for almost a century and a
half. It has been frequently enforced and until Hersie v. Porter,
had never been questioned. 95 While it may be that under the provisions of Section 775 of the C. P. A., certain conditions are required to be shown before a proceeding of this kind, yet notwithstanding this section, the courts feel that it was the intention of the
legislature to give to the tax collector power to enforce all remedies
which would be available under the .C.P. A., without requiring the
comptroller to go through a "needless perfornznce of personal service, entry of judgment and'issue of execution. This provision under
380 of the Tax Law is not inconsistent with the provisions of the
C. P. A. in the enforcement and collection of taxes." 96 Notice of
intent to sell is given however,
before the property is actually put
9 6a
upon the auction block.
The courts feel that "when the assessment is made (or when
the tax is levied), it partakes of the character of a judgment and
'STORY

ON THE CONSTITUTION

(5th ed.) §1945.

Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S.78, 126 L. ed. 658 (1881).
'Matter of N. Y., 136 Misc. 104, 240 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1930).
' Dukich v. Blair, supra note 88; Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co. v.
Roach, 80 N. Y. 339 (1880).
Gautier v. Dilman, 204 N. Y. 20, 97 N. E. 404 (1912) ; Genet v. Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296, 1 N. E. 777 (1885); Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123
(1869); N. Y. Protestant Episcopal Public School v. Davis, 31 N. Y. 574
(1864).
9'Gautier v. Dilman, supra note 93.
Hersee v. Porter, 100 N. Y. 403, 3 N. E. 338 (1885); Lake Shore etc.
Ry. Co. v. Roach, supra note 92; see Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y. 473
(1849).
'Matter of N. Y., supra note 91.
'aN.
Y. City Charter, 928, provides that six days prior to the sale, the
time and place of the sale is to be advertised in three public places, in the
ward where the sale is to be made.
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the acts of the assessors in making it up (or the acts of the sheriff
in issuing the warrant) are judicial in their character." 97
The comptroller, under the Sales
Act, is given authority also
98
to compromise disputed tax claims.
It is a generally recognized principle of the law of taxation that
a statute authorizing the acceptance, directly or indirectly of a part
of the tax in satisfaction of the whole, is unconstitutional and is a
disregard of the principles of equality and uniformity. 9 A settlement for less than the amount due is an unlawful diversion of public money to private use. A municipal corporation cannot under the
guise of a compromise surrender valuable rights or interests in claims
over which there can be no substantial controversy. 00 Municipal
officials can not make gifts of corporate funds '0' and persons contracting 0with
them are bound to take notice of the limits of their
2
powers.
The authority to compromise tax claims may be given, if at all,
where it has actually been shown that no more than the amount settled for can be obtained,1° 3 and if the power of the comptroller to
compromise claims will be upheld, it will be upheld on this ground.
Otherwise, this power in the hands of unscrupulous officials would
promote more political
favoritism and greater corruption than has
04
yet been known.
Section 71 of the Tax Law 10 5 provides that property in the
possession of any person who ought to pay a tax may be seized and
sold for its non-payment, and that no claim of property made to
such goods by any other person shall be available to prevent such
sale. For example, where property of A is in the possession of B,
it may be sold to pay B's delinquent taxes, for it has been held that,
for the purposes of tax collection, the statute conclusively adjudges
'7Brooklyn EL R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 11 App. Div. 127, 132, 42 N.
Y. Supp. 683, 686 (1896). Words in parentheses interpolated.
1 N. Y. LoCAL LAw No. 24, §11, subd. 2.
' Missouri v. Federal Lead Co., 265 Fed. 305 (E. D. Mo. 1920) ; Cincinnati Southern Ry. Co. v. Guenthar, 19 Fed. 395 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1884);
Webb v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 20 Ariz. 580, 185 Pac. 128 (1919);
Ranger Realty Co. v. Miller, Sup. Ct. of Florida, 136 So. 546 (1931) ; Lincoln
M. and T. Co. v. Davis, 76 Kan. 639, 92 Pac. 707 (1907). Contra: State v.
State Ins. Co., 30 N. M. 491, 239 Pac. 741 (1925).
ooMCQUiLLEN ox MuNIcIrPAL CoRP., §2643.
211 O'Brien v. Mayor of City of N. Y., 40 App. Div. 331, 57 N. Y. Supp.
1039 (1899); N. Y. CoNsT. art. 8, §10.
I Moore v. Mayor of City of N. Y., 73 N. Y. 238, 29 Am. Rep. 134
(1878) ; Parr v. President, etc. of Village of Greenbusch, 72 N. Y. 463, 472
(1878); Oswego Falls Corp. v. City of Fulton, 148 Misc. 170, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 436 (1933).
"Ranger Realty Co. v. Miller; Lincoln M. and T. Co. v. Davis, both
szpra note 99.
mBrooklyn Elevated Ry. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 16 Misc. 416, 417, 419,
38 N. Y. Supp. 154, 155 (1896), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 127, 42 N. Y. Supp. 683
(1896).
' N. Y. CONSULmATm LAWS c. 60; N. Y. LAWS 1909 c. 62.
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title to be in the person taxed. Possession is not merely a badge
of ownership, it is title,10 6 and, further, it is stated, that the authority
to seize any property in the possession of the person taxed for the
payment of the tax, even though it is a bailment, 017 or sold on a
conditional sales contract, is due process of law, and is constitutional. L08 This statute has been upheld by our courts, but the authors
have found no decisions of the United States Courts on this point.
What treatment it will receive there, in the light of the eminent
domain and the due process clauses, is speculative. Suffice it to say
our courts have held it to be constitutional time and again.' 09
As yet, of course, there has been no litigation under the New
York City Sales Tax. It has been the purpose of this review to
present the possible points of conflict with a view to determining
the social and legal aspects involved.
CARL

E.

ALPER AND MOSES

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "YELLOW-DoG"

J.

KATZ.

CONTRACT STATUTE.

"The widespread use of this type of contract and the injunction
against labor is slowly impeding a large number of our population
to such an extent that many workers are beginning to look upon
the courts as allies of the employer class. If the laborer feels
that justice cannot be obtained through the medium of the courts,
he will use his own methods. Industrial peace is extremely difficult to maintain if the workers are not permitted to associate
openly, since secret, underground organizations will then flourish.
When responsible trade-unionism was driven out of Colorado
some years ago, radical labor organizations stepped in with ensuing
violence and lawlessness."'

Such is the attitude of organized labor toward the use and effect
of the "yellow-dog" labor contract, that instrument by which an
employee is required to bind himself, as a condition of his employment, that he will not remain or become a member of a labor organization (except, possibly, a "company" union).
Congress, and many of the states, long ago began making efforts
to ban the use of such contracts by passing laws rendering them unoHersie v. Porter; Lake Shore El. Ry. Co. v. Roach; see Sheldon v.
Van Buskirk, all supra note 95.
' Pauley v. Wahle, 29 Hun 116, 16 Week. Dig. 462 (N. Y. 1883).
'o Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, supra note 95; Coie v. Carl, 82 Hun 360, 31
N. Y. Supp. 565, 64 St. Rep. 155 (1894).
' " Supra notes 106, 107 and 108.
'O'Leary, The Case Against the Yellow-Dog Labor Contract (March 1932)
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